public administration (Stokes 2005; Desposato 2007 , Keefer 2007 , Kitscheldt et al. 2010 , Hicken and Simmons 2008 , Hicken 2011 , Stokes et al. 2013 ). In response, many government agencies and non-governmental organizations have attempted to combat votebuying, primarily by convincing voters not to sell their votes. Anti-vote-selling campaigns generally urge voters either to not accept money from candidates in the first place, or to "vote your conscience" despite taking money (Schaffer 2005) . 1 However, there is little work on whether such campaigns are effective at reducing vote-selling.
We conducted a field experiment during the In this paper, we describe a proxy measure that we constructed out of self-reports of Philippine voters participating in our experiment, and present empirical patterns of correlation that we argue help validate it as a measure of vote-selling. This measure is the key outcome variable in the experiment, whose results are described in full in Hicken et al (2014) .
We first describe the context, data collection, and the experimental treatments, 1
A prominent example was the Archbishop of Manila exhorting voters to "take the bait but not the hook" during Marcos-era presidential elections. before turning to the proxy measure of voteselling and its correlates.
I. Context and Experimental Design 2
We conducted our study in Sorsogon City, 
B. The Experiment
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions. In the control group, the baseline interaction ended after the video clip. Two treatment interventions (Promise 1 and Promise 2) invited participants to promise not to sell their vote. Participants randomly assigned to the Promise 1 treatment group were asked to promise not to accept money from any candidates, while participants assigned to the Promise 2 treatment were asked to promise to "vote your conscience," even if they took money from a candidate.
We consider outcomes in three types of municipal elections: mayor, vice-mayor and city council. We are interested in the impact of the promise treatments on vote-selling by study participants.
C. Post-Election Survey
In the month following the election, participants were surveyed a second time.
Participants reported whether they had voted, and who they had voted for in each race.
Voters could vote for one candidate for mayor, one candidate for vice-mayor, and up to four candidates for city council. 4 We experienced very little attrition between waves -95.9% of baseline participants completed the post-election survey, with no significant difference in attrition between treatments.
II. Proxy Measure of Vote-Selling
We cannot directly observe vote-selling, and therefore must use a proxy measure. We construct a measure of "vote-switching" as a proxy for vote-selling. In the mayoral and vice-mayoral races, we say that a voter switched if they report voting for a candidate who was not their highest rated candidate (including ties) in the baseline survey. For the city-council race, we say that a voter switched if they voted for at least one candidate that was not in their top four highest rated candidates (including ties) in the baseline survey. We identify if a voter switched in any of the races. Overall, we observed 56% of 4 Sorsogon City is divided into three separate districts for the City Council election. Each district had between 11 and 13 candidates. voters switching in at least one race, with 12% switching for mayor, 22% switching for vicemayor and 44% switching for city council.
There are many innocuous and legitimate reasons why a voter may have switched their vote. For example, they could have acquired more information about candidates, or decided to evaluate that information differently. A limitation of our data is that we must rely on self-reported voting. One concern is that a reduction in vote-switching may be driven by a social desirability bias in our survey responses, rather than a real change in voting behavior.
In Hicken et al. (2014) Notes: OLS with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the voter voted for a non-favorite candidate in at least one race. Column 1: For each race we calculate the difference in favorability rating between the voter's preferred candidate (lowest rated among the top 4 for the city council race) and the highest rated non-preferred candidate. Favorability Gap is the minimum difference across races. Column 2: For each race we calculate the difference in vote-buying rating between the voter's preferred candidate (lowest rated among the top 4 for the city council race) and the highest vote-buying rating among non-preferred candidate. Vote-Buying Gap is the maximum difference across races. Demographic controls include age, gender, religion, number of household voters, employment, education, migrant status and marital status. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level, * Significant at the 10 percent level.
5
Regressions also include demographic controls. Regressions for individual races are reported in the Online Appendix. Full regression results are available from the authors upon request.
We now examine how differences between candidates in the amount of money offered is related with vote-switching. We asked our survey enumerators to rate the vote-buying activities of each candidate on a 5-point scale (where 1 = "not at all" and 5 = "very much"). 6
As expected, mayoral candidates had the highest rating for vote-buying (avg. = 4.97), followed by vice-mayor (3.49) and city council (2.75). For the city council race, there is also a large variation in the ratings between candidates (st. dev. = 0.78).
For each voter, we can compare the average rating for "dropped" candidates (i.e. candidates rated in the top 4, but not voted for) and "added" candidates (i.e. candidates not in the top 4, but voted for The within-subject comparison is significant for each district individually, as well as for each treatment separately.
behavior is being predominately influenced by vote-buying.
For each voter, we can also calculate the "vote-buying gap"the difference in the votebuying rating of the voter's preferred candidate 8 and the highest rating among all other candidates. The larger the money gap, the greater the imbalance between the amount of money being offered by the voter's preferred candidate and an alternative candidate. We would expect that switching would be more likely to occur when this difference is large. We also construct a measure of the vote-buying gap pooled across races, in which we take the maximum votebuying gap, since this is what should determine whether any switching should occur in any of the races.
In Column 2 of Table 1 we regress voteswitching on the vote-buying gap. We find that switching increases with money gap: a one-point larger money gap is associated with an increase in the likelihood of switching in any race of 23%. The corresponding increase is 17% in the vice-mayor race (β = 0.172, s.e. = 0.034), and 24% in the city council race (β = 0.238, s.e. = 0.032). 9 8
For the city council race we use the minimum rating among favorite candidates. 9 We cannot look at the mayor's race individually, since the two candidates had essentially the same rating.
III. Discussion
In this paper we examine a proxy measure of vote-selling. We compare respondents' preelection ratings of candidates in three municipal electoral races with the candidates they reported actually voting for post-election.
We construct an indicator of "vote-switching," In that paper, we find that inviting voters to promise not to accept money does substantially reduce vote-switching, with the reduction we observe coming entirely from the city council election where candidate payments are smallest. Inviting promises to vote one's conscience do not reduce voteswitching overall. In fact, this treatment increases vote-selling in the mayoral and vicemayoral races, where larger amounts of money are being offered. We propose a behavioral model that can explain the differences in treatment effects between promises and across races. Key to the model is that accepting money from a candidate creates a temptation to actually vote for the votebuyer on election day, and that voters many not fully anticipate the magnitude of this temptation. A promise to "take the money but vote one's conscience" actually increases the number of voters accepting money, since they believe that the promise will allow them to accept the money without changing their votes. However, if the temptation is greater than anticipated, the promise will actually increase vote-switching. The model generates predicted differences in results between promises and between races that are verified in our data.
